

Herring or Hellfire: the Root Cause of the First Anglo- Dutch War

On May 18, 1652, a fleet of forty-two Dutch ships coasted silently off the English shores of Dover. Under the command of Admiral Maarten von Tromp, the ships weighed anchor in the gloom of night, watched closely by a squadron of English ships under the command of Major Nehemiah Bourne. In the breaking light of the next day, reinforced by Admiral Robert Blake, the English fleet gave chase. Admiral von Tromp, just as his ships appeared to be escaping the English fleets, turned, and, with the red flag of battle hoisted, engaged the English warships. The battle lasted through the day, into the night, and as the smoke cleared the next morning von Tromp was defeated.¹ A declaration of war between the United Provinces and England followed shortly after in July, beginning the formal conflict of the First Anglo-Dutch War.

What caused the First Anglo-Dutch War? This question is the cause of much debate as historians attempt to identify the germ of the two-year conflict that later resulted in not one, but four wars. Certainly von Tromp and Blake's altercation off the shore of Dover marked the beginning of formal hostilities between the two nations, but how did such animosity originate? To decisively answer this question, it is necessary to examine the history of the main arguments

¹ Michael A. Palmer, *Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 39-41. Michael A. Palmer specifically mentions the commanding officer of the ships off Dover as Major Nehemiah Bourne and makes note of the lack of specificity in regards to actual numbers of ships in the encounter the following day in his footnotes. Palmer asserts that a separate detachment of Dutch and English ships fought six days earlier, and, while maintaining that such encounters were the result of the Navigation Act, insists that the ensuing conflicts were products of the inability of states to effectively command their naval forces. David Howarth gives an exact figure of forty-two ships in the Dutch squadron that attacked Blake. Howarth also provides the description of "the blood-red flag" which was a signal for battle. David Howarth, *The Men-of-War* (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1978), 39. Simon Groenveld disputes the information that Palmer provides in regard to the officer of the English squadron officer, determining that Sir John Pennington commanded the vessels that observed von Tromp the day prior to the battle. Groenveld also disagrees as to the specific date of the encounter, instead that the conflict occurred on May 29. Simon Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars As a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652." *The Historical Journal*. Vol 30 (September 1987), 541. Prak supports Groenveld's determined date of the official confrontation. Maarten Roy Prak, *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: the Golden Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 47.

surrounding the causes of the war, and the history of competition between the two Protestant nations. Historians of the war base their lines of reasoning largely within the context of the political events during and after the English Civil Wars, as well as economic relations surrounding the Baltic, East India, and Levant trades of the two growing mercantile nations. However the disagreements between the United Provinces and England have a far deeper and scaliier origin, which tied into the politics, economics, and indeed the fiber of every-day Dutch and English life.

The political theories surrounding the causes of the war fall into four separate but intricately interwoven categories. First, during the English Civil War, 1642-1646, the English Crown and Parliament both issued letters of marque against any ships providing the opposing force with goods. These letters hindered Dutch trade as United Province merchants relied heavily on their neutrality to provide shipping services to multiple English ports. During the war years, both sides of the dispute seized Dutch vessels and confiscated their goods. Historian Simon Groenveld mentions many instances throughout the war in which English privateers, both Royalist and Parliamentarian, searched and seized Dutch merchantmen in efforts to harm the opposing side's trade and thereby war efforts.²

Second, such animosity only worsened during the war as both Parliament and the Crown sought to court the diplomatically “neutral” United Provinces. On November 1, 1642, in an

² Groenveld, “The English Civil Wars”, 545-551. Groenveld describes the initiation of Parliamentarian searches of Dutch vessel just prior to the declaration of Civil War (as early as June 17th 1642), and Parliament's hiring of privatized merchant men-of-war. He also outlines the King's reaction which banned trade with hostile English ports (which began in July 1643) and provided letters of marque to merchant men-of-war (which Groenveld asserts were composed of a diverse collection of Irishmen, Flemings, French and Netherlanders). Geyl marks the start of the English Civil War at “the beginning of 1642”, but categorizes the Scottish revolt as earlier, though he provides no definite date. Pieter Geyl, *Orange and Stuart, 1641-1672* (New York: Scribner, 1970), 4-10. Peter Gaunt sets the commencement of official hostilities between Parliament and Charles II on August 22, 1642 following the king's formal declaration of war. Peter Gaunt, *Oliver Cromwell* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), 41.

attempt to clarify their lack of involvement in the war, the United Provinces issued a decree of neutrality. Though the Dutch claimed detachment in these events, their actions proved such statements highly suspect. The Hague rebuked Parliamentary representatives, and, on one occasion, allowed the blatant murder of one of the Commonwealth's ambassadors, all the while allowing the Crown's delegation access to the assembly. This in effect only served to madden the Commonwealth, which continued to grow in power as the King's authority diminished.³

Historians also frame the execution of Charles I as one of the primary political contributors to the Anglo-Dutch conflict due to the marital connections between the Houses of Orange and Stuart. By 1630, Charles I sought a marriage for his daughter Mary of Stuart. He considered an alliance with Spain to gain financial support for his domestic policies, but due to complications settled for a marriage to William II of Orange, Frederick Henry's son. Frederick Henry, the statholder of Holland, welcomed this match for his offspring, as such a marriage eliminated a potential compact between the Spanish, the Provinces' hereditary enemy, and the English. According to multiple accounts, the Dutch exhibited outrage if not outright revulsion for the Parliamentarians following Charles's execution in 1649.⁴ Elizabeth Staffell makes this clear

³ Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars", 544-545, 549, 553-554. Groenveld explains how Parliament sent Walter Strickland to the Hague and how the estates general's refused to allow him into the assembly out of concerns for neutrality. The Hague repeated such repudiatory actions once more in 1646, when Parliament's new ambassador, Issac Dorislaus attempted to broach the subject of an alliance between Parliamentarians and the Dutch. In 1649, "English or Scottish royalists" murdered Dorislaus. Groenveld also illustrates Amsterdam and Rotterdam's view of neutral shipping during the war (549).

⁴ Geyl, *Orange and Stuart*, 5-10, 41-46. Geyl outlines the marriage aims of Charles I for Mary, Frederick Henry's aspirations for a marriage between his son William II and Mary, as well as the Dutch promises to repay such a "great favour". Geyl includes William II's investment of "up to 30,000 francs worth of munitions" to Scottish forces during the second half of the Civil War (44). He highlights the horror of the Dutch in reaction to the beheading of Charles I (46). Groenveld details the marriage between Charles I's daughter, Mary Stuart, and William II as apolitical, despite Charles' attempts to foster an agreement otherwise. Groenveld explains plans between Prince Charles (later Charles II) and William II to enlist Irish or Scottish aid for Charles I (though these plans never came to fruition). Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars", 542-543, 552-553. Israel recognizes the marriage of William II and Mary Stuart as an impressive "political advantage" to the Republic because it forced a rift between England and Spain. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise*, 537-538. Prak describes the English Civil War as having "inflicted deep wounds", particularly the beheading of Charles I. Conversely he describes the growing fear of a reemergence of English monarchy from the house of Orange. Prak, 46-47.

in her article, providing several artistic prints that paint Oliver Cromwell, his administrators and the Long Parliament as usurpers of both royal and religious power.⁵

Several historians record the refusal of an English-Dutch alliance as another contributor to the initiation of hostilities between the two countries. These overtures occurred at several points, including within the marriage negotiations of William II and Mary Stuart, twice during the English Civil Wars on behalf of the Parliamentarians, and once more in March of 1651; at each point Parliament, or the English Crown avidly vied for an intertwining of the two nations. However, these discussions proved fruitless, as England would have required the subordination of the United Provinces to the Commonwealth as a condition of such a compact. Simon Groenveld, Jonathan Israel, Maarten Roy Prak, and Charles H. Wilson all mark this final refusal of England's offer as deciding factor of the Commonwealth's decision to institute the first Navigation Act in 1651.⁶

Yet these political arguments lack the conviction of resolute arguments for two nations to engage in naval warfare. In fact, most of the political considerations may be eliminated through logical means. First, the Dutch refusal of Parliamentarian delegates in favor of the Crown's diplomats proved useless. By 1649, Parliament's forces routed the bulk of Royalist support in England, executed the King, and forced the remaining opposition forces into obscure refuges around the globe. Second, the King's execution and ties between the House of Orange and Stuart proved almost entirely meaningless. During the Civil Wars the Stuarts received no official

⁵ Elizabeth Staffell, "The Horrible-Tail Man and the Anglo-Dutch Wars", *Journal of Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*. 63 (Sept 1987), 170-177.

⁶ Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars", 543, 545, 553. Groenveld provides the first three instances of English proposals for an alliance but makes no mention of the final attempt in 1651. Israel explicitly recounts the English delegation in March of 1651 as seeking "political subordination" of the Dutch, and that if the Dutch would not accept that "pressure of another sort would be brought to bear". Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, 714*. Prak likewise addresses the attempt of a political joining at the behest of Oliver Cromwell in March of 1651. Prak, *The Dutch Republic*, 46. C. H. Wilson marks this date definitively as March 17, 1651. C. H. Wilson, *Profit and Power, a Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (London: Longmans, Green, 1957), 49.

support from their Orangist cousins, partially because of their precarious position in the Dutch political structure. In fact, as early as 1650, the dismantling of the statholderate, following the death of William II, and the absorption of its powers, including the captaincy-general, by the States of Holland rendered the House of Orange impotent within the Dutch government.⁷

By eliminating these two political arguments, only the use of letters of marque and the attempts of the Commonwealth to establish political dominance over the Dutch Republic remain valid considerations for political debates. However, these subjects prove themselves to be economic arguments thinly draped in political clothing; in essence they only embody political reactions to economic circumstances. The institution of letters of marque and reprisal during the English Civil Wars possessed political substance to Englishmen on opposing sides of the dispute, but between the Dutch and English such documents carried only economic value (quite arguably so in light of Dutch political neutrality). Likewise the efforts of the Crown, Parliament, and Oliver Cromwell to subject the United Provinces to political inferiority only came to fruition as a scheme to displace the Dutch as an economic power. Prak adequately explains that, “Cromwell attempted to curb this commercial competition by political means, proclaiming in October 1651 the Navigation Act.”⁸ In fact, until the engagement off the Downs on May 18, which occurred as a direct reaction to the Navigation Act of 1651, the United Provinces contented themselves to largely ignore English posturing.⁹

⁷ Groenveld, “The English Civil Wars”, 546-553. Groenveld reveals that no actual military or logistical support came from the Dutch for Charles I. In fact the Dutch conducted trade with both parties, hence the issuing of letters of marque from both sides in the conflict, which resulted in the apprehension of Dutch merchantmen by both parties. Groenveld specifically notes the use of both the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam as ports for booty, regardless of origins. Israel explains the decline of the House of Orange as a significant governing power following the death of William the II. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: its rise*, 702-703.

⁸ Israel, *The Dutch Republic: its rise*, 714-715. Prak, *The Dutch Republic*, 47. Both Israel and Prak establish a clear connection between England's desire for political alliance and the lessening of Dutch overseas trade.

⁹ Palmer, *Command at Sea*, 41. Palmer clearly states that the Dutch hoped to avert armed struggle. Wilson also illustrates the Dutch desire if not reliance upon either peace or neutrality in interests of their “sensitive”

What role did the Navigation Act document itself play in the start of the war? This inflammatory document aimed to institute permanent protection for the sectors of commerce that English officials termed, “so great a means of the Welfare and Safety of this Commonwealth.”¹⁰ Although historians frequently argue the nature of the Act as a method of state building, the document possessed clear contributions and connections to the English merchant community. It proposed no less than absolute control of goods shipped to and from the island, as well as in English territorial waters. The document aimed at dominion over all aspects of trade to and from the isle of Britain, including essential commodities, bulk goods, and foreign luxuries.¹¹ According to Wilson’s research, such control threatened the essential trade the Dutch had formed from, “a growing interdependence between its component parts,” and that, “the stoppage in one trade might have serious repercussions on the whole.”¹² This volatile interdependence of trades revolved around a tenuous balance of matching import costs with export revenues to supplement paying the overall cost in precious bullion.¹³ Any space left in the merchant vessels was termed ballast and potentially meant the ship’s owner or owners falling into debt.

J.E. Farnell explains with extreme clarity the relationship between several high-placed merchants: Maurice Thompson, Elias Nicholas Roberts, Thomas Andrewes, William Pennoyer, and Michael Davidson; trade councils within the English government; and their subsequent impact on economic legislation such as the Navigation Act of 1651. In fact, Farnell terms

economy. Wilson, *Profit and Power*, 6-7.

¹⁰ “Navigation Act of 1651.” Plymouth State University, 2009. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed October 21, 2013).

¹¹ “Navigation Act of 1651.”

¹² Wilson, *Profit and Power*, 4.

¹³ C. H. Wilson, “Treasure and Trade Balances: The Mercantilist Problem,” *The Economic History Review* 2.2 (1949): 153-154. Wilson explains the practice of using typical national products to supplement the strain of obtaining commodities with bullion.

Thompson as “guiding spirit behind the Navigation Act of 1651.”¹⁴ Information supplied by Theodore K. Raab further establishes such an affiliation. Of the eight merchants mentioned by Farnell, Raab identifies four as directly connected to one or more joint stock companies involved in shipping. Perhaps more interesting, and certainly more compelling, is the number of English gentry, 844, invested in these companies, or more shocking the 39 percent of English peers associated with the industry (see Appendix).¹⁵

The East India Trade, itself a joint stock company tied to the bulk spice shipping from the Far East, is mentioned by some historians as a source of friction between the Dutch and English. However, this may be easily brushed aside. Douglas A. Irwin examines the Dutch East India rivalry with the English prior to the War. He concludes that, although there was a slight economic advantage of Dutch shipping in the East Indies, it was not significant enough to be the root of the disagreement. In fact Irwin firmly cites that by 1663 only 8,000 of the total 126,000 English tonnages engaged in East-India trade, equating to little over six percent of the total nation’s vessels engaged in nautical trade. Irwin further maintains that the pepper trade, although a temporarily novel one, proved to be an unstable trade, as well as one which only profited with annual cargoes due to the monsoon seasons and storms off of the Cape of Good Hope. He stresses that the bulk Northern trades as such proved much more reliable, and therefore more profitable. Irwin's theories are supported by Niels Steensgaard, who asserts that, “trade in northern Europe was primarily a trade in bulky necessities of life: grain, butter, cheese, fish,

¹⁴ J. E. Farnell, “The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War, and the London Merchant Community,” *The Economic History Review* 16, no. 3 (1964): 439-443

¹⁵ Theodore K. Raab, *Enterprise & Empire; Merchant and Gentry Investments in the Expansion of England, 1575-1630* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 25, 47. These eight men were involved in a number of companies, including the East India Company, the Plymouth Venturers, the Massachusetts Bay Company, the Virginia Company, the Bermuda Company, as well as privateering, and “other ventures.” Thompson is recorded as having participated in three of these enterprises. The number of gentry exhibited reflects those involved in only *one* company, and the percentage of peers shown reflects their participation at its height (its lowest point being 19.4 percent). For additional information on these figures see Figures 1 and 2.

wine, timber, wool, woolen and linen textiles, woad, potash, salt, iron copper, and tin.”¹⁶ The relative immaturity of the East India trade also factors into considerations of it being a driving force behind the First Anglo-Dutch War. The Dutch East India Company, or VOC, had only been founded in 1602, and the English East India Company in 1599, while the English Muscovy Company was chartered in the 1550s and the Levant Company which was formed in approximately 1592.¹⁷

The first three clauses of the Navigation Act targeted the *general bulk shipping* which dealt in essential day to day commodities, and as a result should garner a great deal of attention from researchers. In the first clause the Commonwealth disallowed any goods from “Asia, Africa or America” on foreign vessels. The second clause further regulated the trafficking of European merchandise in English ports, and determined that all foreign transports carrying any sort of freight must belong to the country in which the product originated. The third clause reiterates the previous sentiment, stating, “no Goods or Commodities that are of Foreign Growth, Production or Manufacture” should come from any port other than that of their fabrication. Merchants who violated these clauses did so under the risk of losing their cargo, which would be confiscated by the government, and their ship, which would be awarded to the captain who apprehended the

¹⁶ Niels Steensgaard, “The Growth and Composition of the Long Distance Trade of England and the Dutch Republic Before 1750.” in *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early-Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 103-104. Steensgaard categorizes these commodities as staples both before and after the Medieval period and characterizes the Northern European powers as competitors in the world trade only after 1600. However, he estimates the spice trade as 20 percent of the Dutch economy, according to his source N. W. Posthumus.

¹⁷ Stephen R. Bown, *Merchant Kings: When Companies Ruled the World* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010), 27. Bown specifies the exact date of the VOC's founding as March 20, 1602. VOC stands for the Dutch name for their East-India Company, “Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie”, or United East-India Company. James D. Tracy, *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 2. Mordecai Epstein notes a dialogue concerning the incorporation of the Turkey Company and Venice company into “one fellowship” and marks the overall scarcity of records concerning this merger between 1592 and 1600. Mordecai Epstein, *The Early History of the Levant Company* (London: Routledge, 1908), 42. Raab provides an approximation of the Muscovy Company's founding although not its exact date. Theodore K. Raab, *Enterprise & Empire; Merchant and Gentry Investments in the Expansion of England, 1575-1630* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 3.

vessel.¹⁸

The repeated reference, though infrequent in each source, of bulk trade by Irwin, Israel, Michael Palmer, Prak, and Richard W. Unger indicates the bulk trade was deeply coveted source of wealth for both powers. Unger explains that following the early fourteenth century, shipping in Northern Europe was already on the rise.¹⁹ Herman van der Wee describes how the Portuguese temporarily dominated the re-export trade, but due to several problems experienced a sharp decline.²⁰ While both the English and the Dutch sought to fill the void left by Portugal, the Dutch prevailed for several reasons, one of which was nautical design. English shipbuilders continually turned out merchant men-of-war as a matter of national pride, and were offered government incentives to do so.²¹ The Dutch, on the other hand, utilized a new boat known as the *fluyt*, a cheap, weaponless, and man-efficient vessel, which allowed them to maintain low shipping prices, and thereby come to dominate the trade. Developments such as nautical and astrological maps, joint shipping ventures, and smaller crew numbers further facilitated the low shipping costs that enabled Dutch primacy in the bulk trade.²²

The Dutch economy and population relied heavily on this trade for two reasons. The first

¹⁸ “Navigation Act of 1651”. These clauses applied to all of England’s possessions, including England, Ireland, and “any other Lands, Islands, Plantations, or Territories to this Commonwealth belonging”. For exact wording and further details see Appendix “AN ACT for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation.”

¹⁹ Richard W. Unger, “Shipping in the Northern Netherlands 1490-1580,” in *Ships and Shipping in the North Sea and Atlantic, 1400-1800*, ed. Richard W. Unger (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 1-2.

²⁰ Herman van der Wee, “Structural Changes in European Long Distance Trade, and Particularly in the Re-export Trade from South to North, 1350-1750”, in *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early-Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 27-30.

²¹ Violet Barbour, “Dutch And English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century,” *The Economic History Review* a2.2 (1930), 261-264. Barbour presents the sentiment that English sailors view their Dutch counterparts’ unarmed vessels as “weak ships.”

²² Jaap R. Bruijn, “Productivity, Profitability, and Costs of Private and Corporate Dutch Ship Owning in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, in *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early-Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 174-176. Bruijn describes the development of the fluyt, also known as the flyboat, and its impact on Dutch shipping. Both Bruijn and Unger describe the crew for these vessels as small, with Unger providing a more specific average of 14 men. He also explains, in length, the nautical improvements to shipping. Unger, “Shipping in the Netherlands...”, 2-5.

and foremost motivation was sustaining the population. During the Black Plague the Dutch endured remarkably low casualties, and, in fact experienced a period of growth whereas other nations underwent an overall decline. Because of such a population boom the importance of food rose. Though the Dutch reclaimed much land through the building of dykes, the lands salvaged from the water produced poor yields.²³ This prompted the Dutch to turn to other means of obtaining food, and because of this they turned to fishing, which will be described in more depth later, and trading.²⁴ Multiple sources note the importance of cheap Baltic grain as an essential source of sustenance not only for the Hollanders, but also other European nations as they slowly recovered from pestilence.²⁵

The second reason the Dutch prized the bulk trade so much was for its impact on industry. Michael A. Palmer described the carrying trade as lucrative for good reason.²⁶ Due to their geography between the Baltic and Mediterranean and estuaries located on three different major rivers, the Dutch enjoyed an ideal location. Through their steadily growing seaborne trade they obtained multiple countries' raw, or coarsely refined resources for their own personal industrial gain. Dutch shipbuilders employed Baltic timbers, tars and other materials to create finished vessels. For their cloth business, the United Provinces used English cloth, "to form, in

²³ Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise*, 14, 18. Israel notes the overall decline of urban populations in Europe during the Black Plague and by contrast reveals the continuous increase of populations in Dutch cities. He also explains the 14 c. problems with agriculture and flooding due to the increase in flooding coupled with land shrinkage. This was a problem that occurred because land reclamation was at "the limits of what could be achieved with available technology." These circumstances paralleled an increased reliance on Baltic grain and a shift toward dairy farming.

²⁴ Prak, *The Dutch Republic*, 94-100. In this section Prak examines the search for additional forms of sustenance and the purchase Baltic grain. Unger also details the Hollander's search, explaining that the traditional English, French and German markets prove insufficient for their needs. Unger, "Shipping in the Netherlands", 5.

²⁵ Unger, "Shipping in the Netherlands...", 1, 5-6. Unger explains that following the plague favorable climates, crop yields and the subsequent urban population booms created an increase in demand for foreign foodstuffs, which the Dutch provided through bulk trade. This was supported by Southern European farming inefficiencies in the second half of the 1500s. The grain tonnages imported in Holland alone between 1460 and 1560 show an increase of 2200%, rising from a meager 5,000 tons to in excess of 110,000 tons.

²⁶ Palmer, *Command at Sea*, 39.

turn, an important article of further sale and re-export.” Many such industries sprang up around imported materials including tanning, brewing, sugar refinery, and soap production.²⁷ In the 1570s alone, the shipping industry employed 16,500 sailors, though these numbers rose later in the sixteenth century.²⁸

The expansion of these industries and trade markets for the Dutch increased their national prominence, but they achieved such prominence at the expense of the English. Jonathan Israel recounts the “breath-taking speed” in which the Dutch replaced the English in southern naval dominance, specifically in the case of the cloth trade. In reference to Spanish wool, one English account claims, “Whereas we formerly brought home foure or five thousand baggs of cloth wooll and the Hollanders scarce a thousand... they now carry away five or six thousand and wee not past 12 or 1500.”²⁹ Due to their vast carrying trade, Dutch merchants brought home all the necessary materials, alums for dyeing, and raw wool or bulk cloth, to ensure a thriving finished clothing industry. This substitution of Dutch innovation for a staple English industry hurt twofold, as the primary product that England used to supplement bullion in order to participate in the Baltic trades was cloth.³⁰ Ben Coates provides a graph of English broadcloth exports to the Baltic between 1635 and 1652, showing a general decline by 1652, displaying a fall from 9,000 pieces of cloth to well under 4,000. He also generates a chart examining the apprenticeship enrollment between 1635 and 1650 shows a correlating decline in apprentice numbers following

²⁷ Wilson, *Profit and Power*, 3, 6, 27-28. Wilson describes the geographical positioning of the Netherlands in relation to the Baltic states, Southern Europe and the Scheldt, Maas, and Rhine rivers. He provides a basic structuring of the Dutch bulk trade and ancillary industries that formed from the materials shipped into the Provinces' ports. Unger discusses the rise of industry in Holland during the fifteenth century and its subsequent relation to increased fuel demands. Richard W. Unger, “The Dutch Coal Trade in the Seventeenth Century” in *Ships and Shipping in the North Sea and Atlantic, 1400-1800*, ed. Richard W. Unger (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 6.

²⁸ Unger, “Shipping in the Northern Netherlands,” 5. Unger stipulates that this accounted for 2 percent of the population of the Netherlands at the time.

²⁹ Israel, *The Dutch Republic: its rise*, 714. Israel also gives credence to the decline of English textile industry following the rise in Dutch buying power for Spanish cloth and dyes from their American colonies.

³⁰ Wilson, “Treasure and Trade Balances,” 153-154.

1646.³¹ The Dutch merchants also replaced the English in the North Sea's bulk and timber trades.³² Such successes at Britain's expense did not go unnoticed, particularly by English economic writers.

The Navigation Act was not the only reactionary expression against the Dutch economic undermining; two noteworthy documents preceded it. Thomas Mun wrote *England's Treasure by Forraign Trade* in 1630, an economic treatise written which expressed clear opinions about enhancing the nature of England's potential wealth through the capitalization of England's raw resources, abundant workforce, and brokering money lending abroad. In fact, the entire third chapter of his book addresses the self-same topics of the Navigation Act: bulk goods such as corn, cloth, lead, coal, luxuries of silk, spices and indigo, as well as broaching the subject of fisheries and their contribution to natural wealth.³³ Even before Mun, Tobias Gentleman wrote his "Englands Way To Win Wealth, and to employ Ships and Mariners," which likewise stressed the importance of fishing to the Dutch economy and how the fish caught were vital to the trade the Dutch conducted.³⁴ Preceding Gentleman's writings, John Keymore published his "Observations made upon the Dutch Fishing, about the Year 1602."³⁵ Clearly there was

³¹ Ben Coates, *The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London, 1642-50*, (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2004), 171, 206. Cloth working apprentice numbers peaked over 450 in 1646 and fell to under 250 by 1650, supporting the theory that the industry's production, exports, and thereby profits were halved, at the least, by 1650.

³² Palmer, *Command at Sea*, 39. Palmer recounts the expulsion England's Muscovy Company and the serious financial losses incurred as a result. He also mentions the essential manner of the timber trade. Wilson notes the importance of numerous resources, including Baltic timber, for the shipbuilding industry. Wilson, *Profit and Power*, 3.

³³ Thomas Mun, "England's Treasure by Forraign Trade, Mun, Thomas, 1571-1641." Internet Archive. <https://archive.org/details/englandstre00muntuoft> (accessed October 27, 2013). Mun's treatise was published in 1664 by his son, John Mun, in London. Though it was initially written for his son (approximately in 1630), the treatise holds a wealth of economic thought related to the bulk trades and fishing industry. The edition used here is a reprint by Macmillan and Co., printed in 1895, which was scanned into the Internet Archive.

³⁴ Tobias Gentleman, "Englands Way To Win Wealth, and to Employ Ships and Mariners.", 10-14.

³⁵ John Keymore, "Observations Made Upon the Dutch Fishing, About the Year 1602," in *The Phenix: Or, A Revival of Scarce and Valuable Pieces from the Remotest Antiquity Down to the Present Times: Being a Collection of Manuscripts and Printed Tracts, No Where to Be Found But in the Closets of the Curious*. Compiled by John Dunton in 1707. Google Books. (accessed November 8, 2013). The treatise "Observations"

something profitable and very important in the water.

Was this what caused the Dutch to have such a meteoric rise in the bulk goods trade? Was this the true cause of the First-Anglo Dutch War? Indeed the herring cargoes that fishing captains hauled in each year were key in obtaining alternate cargoes once the catch was transported to foreign ports. Whereas the English used cloth as a substitute for bullion to secure their Baltic goods, the Dutch used herring to reduce or eliminate bullion loss.³⁶ This dictates a clear correlation between the rise of Dutch fishing and their vital commodities trade. Sir George Downing stated this quite clearly, “The herring trade is the cause of the salt trade, and the herring and salt trade are the causes of this country [viz. Holland] having, in manner wholly engrossed the trade of the Baltic Sea.”³⁷ D. W. Davies notes that, “large herring cargoes were shipped to the Baltic” and that by “16 of November 1650... of 1,035 ships passing into the Baltic from the North Sea, no less than 986 were from Netherlands ports,” meaning a full 95.27% of those ships were Dutch.³⁸ Table 3.1 illustrates this, showing a correlating increase between lasts of salt (6726 lasts), fish lasts (1222 lasts), and “colonial goods” between 1631 and 1650 (see Appendix).³⁹ The herring industry itself utilized a full 15 % of the total salt the Dutch imported.

This vast industry was referred to as “the Great Fishery” and was a subject of great contention between the Dutch and English. Pieter de la Court, a Dutch biographer, claimed the

was originally printed in 1601.

³⁶ Wilson, “Treasure and Trade Balances,” 153-154.

³⁷ Wilson, *Profit and Power*, 3, 34. Wilson firmly states that the coin for securing bulk cargoes was herring. This is supported by D. W. Davies, who explains the exchange between herring busses, ships carrying salt and the thereafter purchasing of cargoes in the Baltic, Spain, France, Portugal, Venice, etc. D. W. Davies, *A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade*. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1961), 4-5.

³⁸ Davies, *A Primer of Dutch*, 9. This was a steady increase from 1580 when only 54% of the ships were Dutch, and from 1615 when only 67% of the vessels were Dutch.

³⁹ Unger, “The Netherlands Herring Fishery in the Late Middle Ages: The False Legend of Willem Beukels of Biervliet,” in *Ships and Shipping in the North Sea and Atlantic, 1400-1800*, ed. Richard W. Unger (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 337. Unger defines the term “last” in his footnotes as being equivalent to a wagon load of grain, equal to two English tons. The translation to a herring last would factor to twelve casks, or *tonnen*, each containing anywhere between 800 and 1000 fish, making the entire “last” close to 12,000 fish.

industry employed a full 20% of the Dutch population at the time.⁴⁰ The grain that the fish thereby procured in Baltic ports was as Johan De Witt, Holland's foremost politician, put it, "the mother trade".⁴¹ Unger states that, "Herring played an integral part in the 'mother trade,' the shipping of corn and forest products from Baltic ports to the west coast of France and Iberia to be exchanged for salt, wine, and other goods which were in turn brought back to the Netherlands".⁴² Gentleman paints it as the Dutch's, "principle Gold-mine, whereby many thousands of their people of Trades and Occupations, be set on work, well maintained, and do prosper."⁴³ Keymore likewise illustrates the importance of the Fishing industry, claiming in his travels to have seen, "at least 20,000 Sail, and above 400,000 Persons of all Nations... at work... taking those innumerable Riches of Herrings and other Fish..."⁴⁴

Not only was the Dutch fishing industry a source of security cargoes for other bulk goods, but it was also in essence a training camp for sailors. Unger notes that, "expansion of bulk trades in the sixteenth century led to a dramatic increase in the number of ships and with it the number of sailors to man those ships." These experienced sailors came directly from the ever-growing fishing industry.⁴⁵ Other Industries also rose out of the fishing industry. "Shipbuilding, barrel-making, net and sail manufacture," all grew as the herring industry prospered. The fishing boats even had two roles in Dutch industry. Both Unger and Wilson record that during the off-season fluyts were used to transport other cargoes.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Ibid, 3, 34

⁴¹ Davies, *A Primer of Dutch*, 10. "Mother trade" is defined by Davies as a trade that all others depend on.

⁴² Unger, "Dutch Herring, Technology, and International Trade in the Seventeenth Century", in *Ships and Shipping in the North Sea and Atlantic, 1400-1800*, ed. Richard W. Unger (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 253. Unger tells how these goods were in turn either shipped on to the Baltic or processed in some way in the Provinces.

⁴³ Tobias Gentleman, "Englands Way To Win Wealth, and to Employ Ships and Mariners.", 10.

⁴⁴ Keymore, "Observations Made Upon the Dutch Fishing," 223.

⁴⁵ Unger, "Shipping in the Northern Netherlands," 2-4.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

The practice of using herring to secure foreign cargoes was not a new idea. In fact the Hanseatic League had been practicing the same exchange of goods to secure Baltic grain for the Low Countries in the fourteenth century. Archibald Lewis and Timothy Runyan noted that, “[a] source of Hansa's strength was its monopoly on the herring trade of the Baltic.”⁴⁷ However by the fifteenth century the Hansa herring industry experienced serious setbacks. Unger attributes this to the irregular habits of the fish on the eastern North Sea, while Wilson's claims that a shift in the Gulf Stream caused a en masse migration from the Baltic to North Sea.⁴⁸ In any case the Dutch quickly replaced the Hansas in the herring trade for numerous reasons.

Both Hansa fishing off the Scania coast and Dutch fishing off the shores of the Netherlands used to be entirely coastal affairs (See Map of Scania in Appendix). The fishermen would catch what was termed “full herring” or fully grown fish. The fish was then brought to shore, gutted, salted and packed into barrels. It was illegal to salt the fish on board the boats. However as fishermen sailed further and further abroad these practices changed, largely due to the fishing seasons and how they differed in different regions of the ocean. For the Dutch fishermen, the season was typically during the winter months when meat was hard to find. But by the early fourteenth century Dutch fishermen began to sail further and further north along the English coast. Unger reports that the fish caught here, “were bigger, from one third to half again as large as those of the Baltic or the Netherlands coast,” and therefore garnered a better price at market. The salinity of the North Sea, which is greater than the Baltic, ensured this. The Gulf Stream feeds the North Sea with high quantities of salt, which in turn ensures a higher quantity

⁴⁷ Archibald R. Lewis and Timothy Runyan, *European Naval and Maritime History, 300-1500*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 128-130.

⁴⁸ Unger, “The Netherlands Herring Fishery,” 349. Unger emphasizes that only in 1410 alone the herring disappear, subject to what he terms “sudden but short term changes in habits” and that they “reappeared with the same irregularity”.

of plankton, herring's primary diet.⁴⁹ These North Sea herring matured at an earlier time in August, allowing the Dutch to extend the fishing season, and catch fresh herring for a seven month period. This set off a chain reaction in which the Dutch developed larger nets (the *vleet*), and began curing herring on board their ships as a reaction to English hostilities. These factors contributed to the development of the herring bus, which became the basic, mobile fishing and packing plant of the Dutch economy.⁵⁰

By 1580 Holland's fishermen caught and preserved close to 20,000 lasts of herring, a figure that Unger records as “twice the figure for the fourteenth century Scania fishery.” Since Unger stipulates that the herring were so numerous in the Danish Sound, the strait that runs between Scania and Denmark, that the ships “had trouble using their rudders,” the Dutch herring industry must have been a sight to behold. Not only were the Netherlanders hauling away finned gold from the North Sea, but they did so right off the English coast, in full view of the country's occupants, and such boldness was beginning to stink of thievery to the British. Thomas Mun displays sheer fury at the fact that the Dutch were fishing in English territorial waters.

The Fishing in his Majesties seas of England, Scotland, and Ireland is our natural wealth, and would cost nothing but labor, which the Dutch bestow willingly, and thereby draw yearly a very great profit to themselves by serving many places of Christendom with our Fish, for which they return and supply their wants both of foreign Wares and Money, besides the multitudes of Mariners and Shipping, which hereby are maintained, whereof a long discourse might be made to show the particular manage of this important business.⁵¹

Keymore was likewise appalled that the Dutch took “Herrings in his Majesties Seas” and did so at a profit of what he estimated to be no less than “five millions of pounds”.⁵² In a twenty six week period alone, Keymore recorded that the Dutch employed approximately 200 herring

⁴⁹ Unger, “The Netherlands Herring Fishery,” 342-343.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 335-349.

⁵¹ Mun, “Englands Treasure...”, 12-13.

⁵² Keymore, “Observations Made Upon the Dutch Fishing,” 224.

busses, catching roughly 300,000 lasts, equal to 270,000,000 fish, and valued at close to £3,600,000.⁵³ Unger notes that between 1600 and 1629, the Dutch shipped an average of 8,245 lasts of herring through the Danish Sound to the Baltic States and in 1602 alone they transported over 12,000 lasts to the Eastlands.⁵⁴ The value of such an industry during the years leading up to the First Anglo-Dutch War is undeniable.

In fact the Navigation itself highlighted how important the fishing industry was to the English economy. The two articles following those that applied to bulk goods, concerned the lucrative fishing trade, specifically mentioning herring and salted fish, its importation and exportation. The first of these clauses established that the Commonwealth would no longer import any fish, “usually fished for and caught by the people of this Nation,” except in the Commonwealth's vessels. The following provision banned the exportation of salted fish, except through Commonwealth transports. The penalties listed likewise ordained seizure of cargo and ship.⁵⁵ However, this Act was merely an extension of an older, more convoluted debate that had raged for the better half of a decade. This heated discussion was centered on national rights to the seas and the resources that they contained.

The territorial right to the seas, which England disputed through its Navigation Act, the writings of Keymore, Gentleman, and Mun, was an ancient and contentious legal discussion that many famous authors argued. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist, was one such person. He published a book in 1609 named *Mare Liberum*, or in English *the Free Sea* or *The Freedom of the Seas*, which deliberated the idea of free passage on the oceans. Grotius's argument related primarily to

⁵³ Ibid, 224.

⁵⁴ Unger, “Dutch Herring, Technology, and International Trade,” 263. Unger further notes that between 1562 and 1657 the overall average export of herring eastward was 5415 lasts.

⁵⁵ “Navigation Act of 1651.” Other fish and fish products, including Cod-fish, Ling, Pilchard, “or an other kind of salted fish”, “Oyl”, whale-fins, and whale-bones, fell under the supervision of these clauses.

the Dutch conflict with Portuguese traders, but was later applied to the arguments over the Navigation Act.⁵⁶ Within his book, Grotius expressed his belief that “Every nation is free to travel to every other nation and trade with it.” Grotius leveled multiple attacks against the Portugal’s violent defense of their East-India trade, including their claims to the long distance commerce by virtue of discovery, title of war, occupation, prescription, and papal donation.⁵⁷

However, in 1635, less than thirty years after the publication of Hugo Grotius's *Mare Liberum*, an Englishman by the name of John Selden wrote *Mare Clausum Seu de Dominio Maris*, which translates to *Of the Dominion or Ownership of the Sea*, as a direct response to the legal dispute over fishing rights off the English coast and Grotius's *Mare Liberum*. In *Mare Clauseum*, Selden aimed to prove that, “the Sea, by the Law of Nature or Nations, is not common to all men, but capable of private Dominion or propriety as well as the Land,” and that, “the King of *Great Britain* is Lord of the Sea flowing about [England]”.⁵⁸ In Chapter Three of his first book, Selden commenced a dialogue with Grotius's *Mare Liberum*, citing many of the sources he used, and establishing the fact that Grotius propositioned that the Portuguese should not hinder Dutch trade or navigation on the sea. Selden picks apart the underpinning of Grotius's argument by attacking the very ground he stood on, the 'Law of Nations'. He insists that many alterations have been made to the Law when convenient for certain nations and, as such, no longer constitutes a true Law of Nations but instead embodies an, “Intervenient Law of Some

⁵⁶ Edward Dumbauld, *The Life and Legal Writings of Hugo Grotius* [1st ed.] (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 3-5. Hugo Grotius was born in 1583, graduated with his doctorate at age 15 from the University of Orleans, and published numerous legal works throughout his lifetime, including *Mare Liberum*.

⁵⁷ Hugo Grotius, “The Freedom of the Seas (Latin and English version, Magoffin tans.)” Online Library of Liberty. Last modified October 21, 2013.
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticx&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=552&Itemid=27. PDF, 61. Note: the pagination used herein correlates to the numbering used in the PDF file.

⁵⁸ John Selden, “Of the Dominion, or Ownership of the Seas: Two Books.” Internet Archive.
<http://archive.org/details/ofdominionorowne00seld> (accessed 10/22/2013), 2-3. Note: the pagination for this edition is incomplete as pages 101, 177-178, 275-278 are missing and page 99 is repeated.

Nations”.⁵⁹

The legal debate between the two authors is titanic, and far-reaching into the past. Grotius first addressed the Portuguese claim of discovery, and unshakably proclaimed that the nations belonging to the Indies have long maintained their own autonomy, with kings, governments, laws, and legal systems. Grotius also noted that while no Portuguese garrisons existed in the East Indies, the local governments allowed them to trade with their subjects. He proposed that, since the Portuguese paid foreign tolls and obtained the permission of the governing bodies in these countries; they had no sovereignty in these areas and instead remained foreigners.

Grotius declared that Portuguese's claim through Papal donation was flawed because the Pope “is neither civil nor temporal Lord of the whole world.” Grotius furthermore contended that the Pope holds only spiritual power, if any, and as the nations in question follow infidel religious, and possessed no right to give the Portuguese those territories.⁶⁰ He closely followed this argument with the contention that the Portuguese hold no right to these areas through war, stating that they merely conducted trade with the nations that the Dutch wished to initiate similar relations with, and those countries had the right to trade with whom they wished.⁶¹

Although Selden does not provide any support for the employment of papal donation to the Portuguese (such an act would have been exceptionally unlikely considering England's Protestant majority at the time), but he does provide evidence to refute Grotius's religious assertions. In discussing dominion, Selden negates Grotius's uses of Virgil, Seneca, and Tibullus by quoting the Bible's account of Noah and his three sons,

⁵⁹ Selden, “Of the Dominion.”

⁶⁰ Grotius, “The Freedom of the Seas,” 67-68.

⁶¹ Ibid, 69-71. Grotius quotes both Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, whom he later references as Cajetan, as Aquinas was formerly known as Thomas of Cajetan. Here Grotius clearly presents a moral argument against the Portuguese in relation to any potential legal claims to trade which they could procure through force.

“Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the Earth. And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every Beast of the Earth, and every Fowl of the Air, upon all that moveth upon the Earth, and upon all the Fishes of the Sea, into your hands are they delivered.”⁶²

Selden use of biblical history attacks Grotius's employment of similar passages and provides an almost aloof counterpoint to his attack on papal authority, as if to say that his particular use of ancient texts no place in this legal debate.

Grotius's next argument presented itself as the most interesting, and consequently longest, of his book. Here Grotius referenced the Law of Nations, which, he says, indicated a potential of three possibilities: that the sea belonged to no one (termed *res nullius*), or countries possessed seas commonly (*res communis*), or that nations owned these bodies publicly (*res publica*). Grotius followed these terms with quotations from Cicero, Vergil, and Ovid, to name a few of his sources, but his strongest argument related to Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian. Grotius quoted that “Thucydides call the land which in the division falls to no nation, ὄριςτος that is undefined, and undetermined by boundaries.”⁶³

Through this evidence, Grotius indicated that a person or nation cannot possess what they have never occupied. He further maintained that such entities as the air, sea, animals and fish fell under what the Romans categorize as natural law, though people might obtain beasts and fish and thereby rendered them property. Navigation, Grotius suggests, falls under similar circumstances as fishing. He quoted St. Ambrose, the Bishop of Milan whom he labeled 'the Holy Man', who declared that, “The lords of the earth claim for themselves a wide expanse of sea by *jus mancipii*, and they regard the right of fishing as a servitude over which their right is the same as that over their slaves.” He also presented Placentinus's argument that, “the sea is a thing so clearly

⁶² Selden, “Of the Dominion”, 18.

⁶³ Grotius, “The Freedom of the Seas,” 74. The English pronunciation of this word is [Aoristos]. "A - An Illustrated Glossary of Hellenic Polytheism." HellenicGods.org. <http://www.hellenicgods.org/a>, (accessed November 11, 2013).

common to all, that it cannot be the property of one save God alone.”⁶⁴

Selden, to counter, cites Moses, showing that the Israelites once settled divided land amongst themselves “according to the number of their families”. He thereafter insinuates that anything not held commonly or privately, by tradition of old custom, “are his who apprehends them first by occupation.”⁶⁵ In fact, Selden uses his entire first book to shred Grotius's claims through use of literary, religious, legal and historical precedents, ranging from biblical histories, such as Cain and Abel, to King Minos of Crete, all the way through the Greek and Persian dispute of the sea during their wars. In chapter fifteen he quotes Stephanus Forcatulus, the “once Professor of the Civil Law at Tholose,” in saying, “that there is nothing to hinder, but that the Sea, though common to all, may by public decree be subjected to a Prince by the same right he hold's his adjoining Kingdom.”⁶⁶

With his primary arguments in place, Grotius railed against the presumably absurdity that Nature came to fruition in such a manner as to provide the Portuguese with occupancy of the oceans. He in fact scorned the term occupation with a great deal of contemptuousness, and laughingly pointed out that the Portuguese considered the mere fact that they sailed over the waters as evidence of ownership to seas others sailed well before them. Grotius immediately thereafter, in a unmistakably derisive manner, listed *every* nation to ever, recorded or suspected, to journey over the seas that the Portugal laid claim to. He snickered at the idea that if the Portuguese never voyaged to these regions, that no other nation would attempt a similar trip, and contended that other major powers would have certainly intended to accomplish the same feat.⁶⁷ These arguments were the definition of the Provinces claim to neutrality. By establishing that

⁶⁴ Grotius, “The Freedom of the Seas,” 79.

⁶⁵ Selden, “Of the Dominion,” 21.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 95.

⁶⁷ Grotius, “The Freedom of the Seas,” 83-86.

nobody could legally own the seas, they instead proposed that the ocean was free for travel, trade, and exploitation.

Selden, in response drives to the heart of the matter, and uses what seems to be an infinite number of circumstances relating to nations such as, France, Spain, Denmark, Lithuania, Pomerania, Poland, Venice, and Genoa, to name the majority, and their history of exerting the right to dominion over adjacent bodies of water. Inasmuch he pointedly remarks, “a private Dominion of the Sea, which is the point in Question, is founded upon such clear Testimonies, out of Customs of so many famous Nations both ancient and modern.... nothing now... hinders why we may not determine, that the sea is capable of Dominion as well as Land.”⁶⁸

Selden also included legal documents from the reigns of Kings James I and Charles I in his additional evidences. These decrees were issued in a further attempt to establish English rights to their territorial waters and the vast wealth that swam lazily underneath their surface. One of such proclamation written by James I, *A Proclamation Touching on Fishing*, states:

We have been contented since Our coming to the Crown, to tolerate an indifferent and promiscuous kind of liberty to all Our Friends whatsoever, to Fish within Our Streams and upon any of our Coasts” and, “finding that... hath been a means of daily wrongs to Our own People that exercise the Trade of Fishing... we have resolved to give notice that... Our express pleasure is... no person of what Nation or Quality soever, being not Our natural born Subject bee permitted to fish upon any of our Coasts or Seas.”⁶⁹

Selden notes with disdain that, in spite of this royal and legally binding document, the Dutch continued to violate English territorial waters, while arguing they had every right to do so,

⁶⁸ Selden, “Of the Dominion...”, 16, 17, 97, 122. Selden also calls the Interventive Law the “Law Civil or Domestick of divers[e] Nations.” Virgil’s quotation is as follows, “Nor was it lawful when their Lands to bound; they lived in common All upon the Ground..” Entire chapters in discuss historical ownership of the sea under the Minoan, Egyptians, Greeks, Persians, Carthaginians, and Romans. In the case of Selden’s use of Forcatulus’s quotation, he directly responds to Grotius’s employment of Botrojan Farm, a circumstance utilized to imply that ownership of waters abiding on or adjoining a property are not conferred to a landholder. The closing argument to dominion of the sea is expressed in chapter XIX. Additionally there another 60 pages closing Selden’s discussion of general claims of dominion to the oceans.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 464-467.

because of previous allowances made by the English crown under James I and Queen Elizabeth I.

When Grotius published *Mare Liberum* in 1609, he established a distinct school of thought surrounding the concept free navigation on the sea that the Dutch used to defend their constant neutrality as a both trading entity and defend their fishing off the coasts of England. Grotius stated, “the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become the possession of any one...whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries,” and additionally, “the same principle that applies to navigation applies also to fishing, namely that it remains free and open to all”.⁷⁰ He was sorely mistaken.

The First Anglo-Dutch war was a direct response to the incredibly lucrative herring industry and its monumental importance to the bulk trades that came to dominate the European markets in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The United Provinces rise to power was unexpected and unprecedented, with it being both such a small nation in terms of landmass and natural resources. Yet the tiny country utilized what the sea provided, built upon it one of the most powerful commercial empires in history, and raised a navy that challenged the world. These were the first dominoes to come tumbling down in a series of events that would inevitably lead to the first of several naval wars between the two budding powers. Though the politics and lucrative trade in commodities certainly contributed to the onset of the First-Anglo Dutch War, it was the herring, a creature so seemingly insignificant, which was the cause of it all.

⁷⁰ Grotius, “The Freedom of the Seas,” 76 & 78.

Works Cited

- "A - An Illustrated Glossary of Hellenic Polytheism." HellenicGods.org.
<http://www.hellenicgods.org/a> (accessed November 11, 2013).
- Barbour, Violet. "Dutch And English Merchant Shipping In The Seventeenth Century." *The Economic History Review* a2.2 (1930): 261-290.
- Bown, Stephen R.. *Merchant Kings: When Companies Ruled the World, 1600-1900*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010.
- Brenner, Robert. *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Coates, Ben. *The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London. 1642-50*. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2004.
- Davies, David W.. *A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1961.
- Dumbauld, Edward. *The Life and Legal Writings of Hugo Grotius*. [1st ed.] Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969.
- Dunton, John. "The Phenix: Or, A Revival of Scarce and Valuable Pieces from the Remotest Antiquity Down to the Present Times: Being a Collection of Manuscripts and Printed Tracts, No Where to Be Found But in the Closets of the Curious." Google Books.
http://books.google.com/books?id=P8IPAAAAQAAJ&pg=PR1&lpg=PR1&dq=The+phenix+:+or,+a+revival+of+scarce+and+valuable+pieces+from+the+remotest+antiquity+down+to+the+present+times.+Being+A+Collection+of+Manuscripts+and+Printed+Tracts,+no+where+to+be+found+but+in+the+Closets+of+the+Curious.+By+a+gentleman+who+has+made+it+his+business+to+search+after+such+pieces+for+Twenty+Years+past.&source=bl&ots=FHU93Sfpn9&sig=LYoB48dyb1f-eQIMm_W7DHktj_I&hl=en&sa=X&ei=97KBUTasJvHdsATpr4CIAg&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed November 8, 2013).
- Epstein, Mordecai. *The Early History of the Levant Company*. London: Routledge, 1908.
- Farnel, J. E.. "The Navigation Act Of 1651, The First Dutch War, And The London Merchant Community." *The Economic History Review* 16, no. 3 (1964): 439-454.
- Gaunt, Peter. *Oliver Cromwell*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996.
- Gentleman, Tobias . "Englands Way To Win Wealth, and to Employ Ships and Mariners."
<http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/>
<http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/gentleman/EnglandsWayToWinWealth.pdf>

(accessed November 9, 2013).

Geyl, Pieter. *Orange and Stuart, 1641-1672*. New York: Scribner, 1970.

Groenveld, Simon. "The English Civil Wars As a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652." *The Historical Journal*. no. 3 (Sept. 1987): 541-566.

Grotius, Hugo. "The Freedom of the Seas (Latin and English version, Magoffin trans.)." Online Library of Liberty.
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=552&Itemid=27 (accessed October 21, 2013).

Hammerin, Eric. "Guide for tours in Skane / Scania Province in the very south of Sweden." *erichammerin.se*. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2013.
<http://www.erichammerin.se/guide/guide_

Howarth, David Armine. *The Men-of-War*. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1978.

Irwin, Douglas A. "Mercantilism as Strategic Trade Policy: The Anglo- Dutch Rivalry for the East India Trade." *Journal of Political Economy*. no. 6 (1991): 1296-1314.

Israel, Jonathan I. *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Lewis, Archibald R., and Timothy J. Runyan. *European Naval and Maritime history, 300-1500*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

"Navigation Act of 1651." Plymouth State University, 2009. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed October 21,2013).

Mun, Thomas. "England's Treasure by Forraign Trade. 1664 : Mun, Thomas, 1571-1641." Internet Archive. <https://archive.org/details/englandstre00muntuoft> (accessed October 27, 2013).

Palmer, Michael A.. *Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Prak, Maarten Roy. *The Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century: the golden age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Rabb, Theodore K.. *Enterprise & Empire; Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575-1630*,. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.

Selden, John. "Of the Dominion, or Ownership of the Sea: Two Books." Internet Archive. <Http://archive.org/details/ofdominionorowne00seld> (accessed 10/22/2013).

Staffell, Elizabeth. "The Horrible Tail-Man and the Anglo-Dutch Wars." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*. (2000): 169-186.

Tracy, James D.. *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350- 1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Unger, Richard W.. *Ships and Shipping in the North Sea and Atlantic, 1400-1800*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997.

Wilson, Charles. "Treasure And Trade Balances: The Mercantilist Problem." *The Economic History Review* 2.2 (1949): 152-161.

Wilson, C. H.. *Profit and Power; A Study of England and the Dutch Wars*. London: Longmans, Green, 1957.

Bibliography

- "A - An Illustrated Glossary of Hellenic Polytheism." HellenicGods.org.
<http://www.hellenicgods.org/a> (accessed November 11, 2013).
- Barbour, Violet. "Dutch And English Merchant Shipping In The Seventeenth Century." *The Economic History Review* a2.2 (1930): 261-290.
- Bown, Stephen R.. *Merchant Kings: When Companies Ruled the World, 1600-1900*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010.
- Brenner, Robert. *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Brindley, H.H.. Review of "Lists of Men-of-War, 1650-1700: Part iv, Ships of the United Netherlands, 1648-1702, by R.C. Anderson." *The English Historical Review* 55, no. 219 (1940): 500-501.
- Brindley, H.H.. Review of: "Lists of Men-of-War, 1650-1700. Part I. English Ships, 1649-1720, by R.C. Anderson." *The English Historical Review* 51, no. 204 (1936): 707-709.
- Bull, Hedley, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts. *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- Armitage, David. "The Cromwellian Protectorate And The Languages Of Empire." *The Historical Journal* 35, no. 03 (1992): 531.
- Blitzer, Charles. *The Commonwealth of England: Documents of the English Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and Protectorate*. 1641-1660. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1963.
- Coates, Ben. *The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London*. 1642-50. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2004.
- Corbett, Jullian S. "Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Publications Of The Navy Records Society Vol. XXIX." Last Accessed September 12th, 2013.
<http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/16695/pg16695.html>
- Davies, David W.. *A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1961.
- Dumbauld, Edward. *The Life and Legal Writings of Hugo Grotius*. [1st ed.] Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969.
- Dunton, John. "The Phenix: Or, A Revival of Scarce and Valuable Pieces from the Remotest Antiquity Down to the Present Times: Being a Collection of Manuscripts and Printed

- Tracts, No Where to be Found But in the Closets of the Curious.” Google Books.
http://books.google.com/books?id=P8IPAAAAQAAJ&pg=PR1&lpg=PR1&dq=The+phoenix:+or,+a+revival+of+scarce+and+valuable+pieces+from+the+remotest+antiquity+down+to+the+present+times.+Being+A+Collection+of+Manuscripts+and+Printed+Tracts,+no+where+to+be+found+but+in+the+Closets+of+the+Curious.+By+a+gentleman+who+has+made+it+his+business+to+search+after+such+pieces+for+Twenty+Years+past.&source=bl&ots=FHU93Sfpn9&sig=LYoB48dyb1f-eQlMm_W7DHktj_I&hl=en&sa=X&ei=97KBUtasJvHdsATpr4CIAg&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed November 8, 2013).
- Epstein, Mordecai. *The Early History of the Levant Company*. London: Routledge, 1908.
- Farnel, J. E.. "The Navigation Act Of 1651, The First Dutch War, And The London Merchant Community." *The Economic History Review* 16, no. 3 (1964): 439-454.
- Fulton, Thomas Wemyss. "The Sovereignty of the Sea : A Historical Account of the Claims of England to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of the Evolution of the Territorial Waters : With Special Reference to the Rights of the Fishing and the Naval Salute (1911)." Internet Archive. <https://archive.org/details/sovereigntyofsea00fultuoft> (accessed October 29, 2013).
- Gaunt, Peter. *Oliver Cromwell*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996.
- Gentleman, Tobias . "Englands Way To Win Wealth, and to Employ Ships and Mariners." <http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/>.
<http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/gentleman/EnglandsWayToWinWealth.pdf>
 (accessed November 9, 2013).
- Geyl, Pieter. *Orange and Stuart, 1641-1672*. New York: Scribner, 1970.
- Groenveld, Simon. "The English Civil Wars As a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652." *The Historical Journal*. no. 3 (Sept. 1987): 541-566.
- Grotius, Hugo. "The Freedom of the Seas (Latin and English version, Magoffin trans.)." Online Library of Liberty.
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=552&Itemid=27 (accessed October 21, 2013).
- Hammerin, Eric. "Guide for tours in Skane / Scania Province in the very south of Sweden." *erichammerin.se*. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2013.
 <http://www.erichammerin.se/guide/guide_
- Howarth, David Armine. *The Men-of-War*. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1978.
- Irwin, Douglas A. "Mercantilism as Strategic Trade Policy: The Anglo- Dutch Rivalry for the East India Trade." *Journal of Political Economy*. no. 6 (1991): 1296-1314.

- Israel, Jonathan I.. *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
- Lewis, Archibald R., and Timothy J. Runyan. *European Naval and Maritime history, 300-1500*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
- “Navigation Act of 1651.” Plymouth State University, 2009. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed October 21,2013).
- Mun, Thomas. "England's Treasure by Forraign Trade. 1664 : Mun, Thomas, 1571-1641." Internet Archive. <https://archive.org/details/englandstre00muntuoft> (accessed October 27, 2013).
- Palmer, Michael A.. *Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control Since the Sixteenth Century*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Palmer, Michael A.. ""The Soul's Right Hand": Command and Control in the Age of Fighting Sail, 1652-1827." *The Journal of Military History* 61, no. 4 (1997): 679-705.
- Prak, Maarten Roy. *The Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century: the golden age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Rabb, Theodore K.. *Enterprise & Empire; Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575-1630*,. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Selden, John. “Of the Dominion, or Ownership of the Sea: Two Books.” Internet Archive. <Http://archive.org/details/ofdominionorowne00seld> (accessed 10/22/2013).
- Staffell, Elizabeth. "The Horrible Tail-Man and the Anglo-Dutch Wars." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*. (2000): 169-186.
- Tracy, James D.. *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350- 1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Toyoda, Tetsuya. *Theory and Politics of the Law of Nations Political Bias in International Law Discourse of Seven German Court Councilors in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Leiden: BRILL, 2011.
- Unger, Richard W.. *Ships and Shipping in the North Sea and Atlantic, 1400-1800*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997.
- Wheaton, Henry, and Nassau William Senior. *History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America, from the Earliest Times to the Treaty of Washington, 1842*,. Garland Library Edition ed. New York: Garland Pub., 1973.

Wilson, Charles. "Treasure And Trade Balances: The Mercantilist Problem." *The Economic History Review* 2.2 (1949): 152-161.

Wilson, C. H.. *Profit and Power; A Study of England and the Dutch Wars*. London: Longmans, Green, 1957.

Appendix

Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, Vol II, p. 559-562

AN ACT for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation.

For the Increase of the Shipping and the Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation, which under the good Providence and Protection of God, is so great a means of the Welfare and Safety of this Commonwealth; Be it Enacted by this present Parliament, and the Authority thereof, That from and after the First day of December, One thousand six hundred fifty and one, and from thence forwards, no Goods or Commodities whatsoever, of the Growth, Production or Manufacture of Asia, Africa or America, or of any part thereof; or of any Islands belonging to them, or any of them, or which are described or laid down in the usual Maps or Cards of those places, as well of the English Plantations as others, shall be Imported or brought into this Commonwealth of England, or into Ireland, or any other Lands, Islands, Plantations or Territories to this Commonwealth belonging, or in their Possession, in any other Ship or Ships, Vessel or Vessels whatsoever, but onely in such as do truly and without fraud belong onely to the People of this Commonwealth, or the Plantations thereof, as the Proprietors or right Owners thereof; and whereof the Master and Mariners are also for the most part of them, of the People of this Commonwealth, under the penalty of the forfeiture and loss of all the Goods that shall be Imported contrary to this Act; as also of the Ship (with all her Tackle, Guns and Apparel) in which the said Goods or Commodities shall be so brought in and Imported; the one moyety to the use of the Commonwealth, and the other moyety to the use and behoof of any person or persons who shall seize the said Goods or Commodities, and shall prosecute the same in any Court of Record within this Commonwealth.

And it is further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That no Goods or Commodities of the Growth, Production or Manufacture of Europe, or of any part thereof, shall after the First day of December, One thousand six hundred fifty and one, be imported or brought into this Commonwealth of England, or into Ireland, or any other Lands, Islands, Plantations or Territories to this Commonwealth belonging, or in their possession, in any Ship or Ships, Vessel or Vessels whatsoever, but in such as do truly and without fraud belong onely to the people of this Commonwealth, as the true Owners and Proprietors thereof, and in no other, except onely such Foreign Ships and Vessels as do truly and properly belong to the people of that Countrey or Place, of which the said Goods are the Growth, Production or Manufacture; or to such Ports where the said Goods can onely be, or most usually are first shipped for Transportation; And that under the same penalty of forfeiture and loss expressed in the former Branch of this Act, the said Forfeitures to be recovered and imployed as is therein expressed.

And it is further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That no Goods or Commodities that are of Foreign Growth, Production or Manufacture, and which are to be brought into this Commonwealth, in Shipping belonging to the People thereof, shall be by them Shipped or brought from any other place or places, Countrey or Countreys, but onely from those of their said Growth, Production or Manufacture; or from those Ports where the said Goods and Commodities can onely, or are, or usually have been first shipped for Transportation; and from none other Places or Countreys, under the same penalty of forfeiture and loss expressed in the first Branch

of this Act, the said Forfeitures to be recovered and employed as is therein expressed.

And it is further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That no sort of Cod-fish, Ling, Herring, Pilchard, or any other kinde of salted Fish, usually fished for and caught by the people of this Nation; nor any Oyl made, or that shall be made of any kinde of Fish whatsoever; nor any Whale-fins, or Whale-bones, shall from henceforth be Imported into this Commonwealth, or into Ireland, or any other Lands, Islands, Plantations, or Territories thereto belonging, or in their possession, but onely such as shall be caught in Vessels that do or shall truly and properly belong to the people of this Nation, as Proprietors and Right Owners thereof: And the said Fish to be cured, and the Oyl aforesaid made by the people of this Commonwealth, under the penalty and loss expressed in the said first Branch of this present Act; the said Forfeit to be recovered and employed as is there expressed.

And it is further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That no sort of Cod, Ling, Herring, Pilchard, or any other kinde of Salted Fish whatsoever, which shall be caught and cured by the people of this Commonwealth, shall be from and after the First day of February, One thousand six hundred fifty three, exported from any place or places belonging to this Commonwealth, in any other Ship or Ships, Vessel or Vessels, save onely in such as do truly and properly appertain to the people of this Commonwealth, as Right Owners; and whereof the Master and Mariners are for the most part of them English, under the penalty and loss expressed in the said first Branch of this present Act; the said Forfeit to be recovered and employed as is there expressed.

Provided always, That this Act, nor any thing therein contained, extend not, or be meant to restrain the Importation of any of the Commodities of the Straights or Levant Seas, loaden in the Shipping of this Nation as aforesaid, at the usual Ports or places for lading of them heretofore, within the said Straights or Levant Seas, though the said Commodities be not of the very Growth of the said places.

Provided also, That this Act nor any thing therein contained, extend not, nor be meant to restrain the Importing of any East-India Commodities loaden in the Shipping of this Nation, at the usual Port or places for Lading of them heretofore in any part of those Seas, to the Southward and Eastward of Cabo Bona Esperanza, although the said Ports be not the very places of their Growth.

Provided also, That it shall and may be lawful to and for any of the People of this Commonwealth, in Vessels or Ships to them belonging, and whereof of the Master and Mariners are of this Nation as aforesaid, to load and bring in from any of the Ports of Spain and Portugal, all sorts of Goods or Commodities that have come from, or any way belonged unto the Plantations or Dominions of either of them respectively.

Be it also further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That from henceforth it shall not be lawful to any person or persons whatsoever, to load or cause to be loaden land carried in any Bottom or Bottoms, Ship or Ships, Vessel or Vessels whatsoever, whereof any Stranger or Strangers born (unless such as be Denizens or Naturalized) be Owners, part Owners, or Master, any Fish, Victual, Wares, or things of what kinde or nature soever the same shall be, from one Port or Creek of this Commonwealth, to another Port or Creek of the same, under penalty to every one

that shall offend contrary to the true meaning of this Branch of this present Act, to forfeit all the Goods that shall be so laden or carried, as also the Ship upon which they shall be so laden or carried, the same Forfeit to be recovered and impoyed as directed in the first Branch of this present Act.

Lastly, That this Act nor any thing therein contained, extend not to Bullion, nor yet to any Goods taken, or that shall be taken by way of Reprizal by any Ship or Ships, having Commission from this Commonwealth.

Provided, That this Act, or any thing therein contained, shall not extend, nor be construed to extend to any Silk or Silk-wares which shall be brought by Land from any parts of Italy, and there bought with the proceed of English Commodities, sold either for Money or in Barter; but that it shall and may be lawful for any of the People of this Commonwealth to ship the same in English Vessels from Ostend, Newport, Rotterdam, Middleburgh, Amsterdam, or any Ports thereabouts; the Owners and Proprietors first making Oath by themselves, or other credible Witness, before the Commissioners of the Customs for the time being, or their Deputies, or one of the Barons of the Exchequer, that the Goods aforesaid were so bought for his or their own proper accompt in Italy.

The Essential Documents of American History was compiled by Norman P. Desmarais and James H. McGovern of Providence College.

“Navigation Act of 1651.” Plymouth State University, 2009. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost (accessed October 21,2013).

Annual Average Transport of Selected Commodities through The Sound			
	Colonial commodities (1,000 pd*)	Salt (lasts)	Fish (lasts)
1631-40	1440	25002	10965
1641-50	2001	31728	12187
1651-60	1495	26583	6106
1661-70	1826	18917	3515
1671-80	2796	25799	3927
1681-90	3615	21237	4609
1691-1700	3665	21237	3468
1701-10	3052	18632	1499
1711-20	4337	22981	3127
1721-30	7553	26176	3680
1731-40	8556	26635	4125
1741-50	10286	35290	4793
1751-60	12644	33886	7378

The Dutch pound (pd*) is 494.09 grams. The English pound (lb) is 453.55 grams.

Niels Steensgaard, "The Growth and composition of the long distance trade of England and the Dutch Republic before 1750." in *The Rise of Merchant Empires: long distance trade in the early-modern world, 1350-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 105.




Figure 1: Memberships in companies, according to social class

Number of Companies invested in (no more than)	Gentry	Other non-merchants	Merchants	Unclassified	Percentage of classified investors who were gentry or non-merchants
1	884	61	2554	1105	26.2
2	186	9	709	38	21.6
3	77	3	316	7	20.1
4	27	1	157	2	15.1
5	13	0	82	0	13.7
6	8	0	44	0	15.4
7	4	0	31	0	11.4
8	6	0	15	0	28.6
9	3	0	13	0	18.8
10	3	0	3	0	50
11 or more	6	0	9	0	40
Total	1177	74	3933	1152	24.2
Total number of investments ^a	1875	92	6807	1210	22.4
Average number of companies per investor	1.58	1.24	1.73	1.05	-

^a That is, number of people multiplied by number of companies invested in.

Theodore K. Raab, *Enterprise & Empire; merchant and gentry investment in the expansion of England, 1575-1630*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 53.

Figure 2: Directorships and governorships, according to social class

Number of directorships or governorships held (no more than)	Gentry (number of peers indicated in parentheses)	Other-non merchants	Merchants	Unclassified	Percent of classified directors or governors who were gentry or non-merchants
1	147 (46)	5	317	22	32.4
2	13 (5)	0	86	1	13
3	1 (0)	0	21	0	4.6
4 or more	0 (0)	0	11	0	0
Total	161 (51)	5	435	23	28.1
Total number of directorships or governorships ^a	176 (56)	5	614	24	22.8
Average number of directorships or governorships	1.09	1	1.14	1.04	-

^a That is, number of people multiplied by number of directorships or governorships.

Theodore K. Raab, *Enterprise & Empire; merchant and gentry investment in the expansion of England, 1575-1630*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 55.



Note* Scania, also written as Skane, is part of present-day Sweden.

Hammerin, Eric. "Guide for tours in Skane / Scania Province in the very south of Sweden." *erichammerin.se*. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2013.
<http://www.erichammerin.se/guide/guide_